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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
In recent year, the private sector in Thailand has increasingly relied on the corporate bond 
market as a source of debt finance. Thai Bond Market Association reported that in 2009, the issuance 
of long-term corporate bonds increased by 49. 84% compared to that of 2008, from THB 261billion 
to THB 391billion which reached the all-time high record. Also, domestic bond market 
capitalization surpassed stock market capitalization in 2008, the size of domestic bond is THB 
5,080billion whereas the market capitalization of the SET is only THB 3,568billion. These 
significant growths have been seen in the year following economic crisis in 1997. It was due to the 
economic crisis forced commercial bank to be much stricter to offer new loans to private sector. 
Consequently, private sector started to issue new bonds for funding new projects, resulting in 
significant growth of corporate bond. Nevertheless, bond market is still considered inactive because 
liquidity remains an obstacle, especially in secondary market because disclosure of fundamental 
information and pricing are not fully transparent. This insufficiency of liquidity has made investors 
hesitate to trade bonds actively. However, a great deal of researches has reported that one of most 
significant factors affecting bond liquidity is credit rating. Therefore, it is crucial to strengthen the 
capability of credit rating agencies (CRAs) in order to creating fair market practices and improve 
liquidity in bond market.  
Generally speaking, credit ratings provide an overall assessment of the credit worthiness of 
issuers and securities as well as serve as an important indicator by which many investors rely on in 
making investment decisions. Put another way, CRAs are believed to obtain non-public information 
from bond issuers as a part of the rating process. Some examples of non-public information could be 
earnings forecasts, financing plans, acquisitions, product modifications which should be not 
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disclosed to competitors. Also, CRAs are expected to specialize in the information gathering and 
evaluating of a bond issuer's financial strength. Thus, it is believed that CRAs would provide 
valuable information to investors who would not know much about the issuers and their underlying 
loans. However, the recent performance of CRAs have been widely debated for inaccurate and slow 
reaction to new information, such as AIG and Lehman Brother which carried investment grade of 
AAA and AA respectively with positive outlook up until the time of their collapse. Not surprisingly, 
the failures of the three biggest CRAs have raised questions concerning the rating process and the 
accountability of CRAs. In Thailand, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s mainly rate government and 
some financial institutions while TRIS, the first local CRA, and Fitch largely rate corporate bonds. 
As mentioned earlier, bond market in Thailand has become more matured and credit rating agencies 
are now taking on more prominent roles. These concerns make it very important to understand the 
role of CRAs and their influence in financial markets. This study is intended to explore the effect of 
local CRA, rather than global CRAs. Hence, only TRIS will be discussed in this paper.  
As we know, there are three key parties involved in the credit ratings industry: ratings 
agencies, bond issuers, and investors. Normally, bond issuers want to receive the high ratings as the 
higher credit rating means lower costs. Meanwhile, investors want rating to accurately reflect default 
probabilities and not to be lowered. When the rating of company is changed, if the investors or 
market as a whole believe so, they might make a decision to sell or hold the stocks and bonds of 
such company. As a result, such change may affect the firm either positively and negatively over 
price of securities. Credit ratings appear to be a major factor in the investment decision for investors 
and play a key role in marketing and pricing of the securities. Given that the secondary market of 
Thai corporate bonds is somewhat inactive and does not provide adequate pricing information for the 
purpose of this study, only stock price movements in response to credit rating announcements will be 
looked at to examine the role of TRIS and its influence on investors’ behavior   
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1.2 Research Questions 
The primary question of this research is how influence TRIS is to the financial market in 
Thailand. The main hypothesis to be tested in this study are: 
Hypothesis 1: Downgrade announcements from TRIS are expected to produce a significant (negative / 
positive) share market reaction 
Hypothesis 2: Upgrade announcements from TRIS are expected to produce a significant (negative / 
positive) share market reaction  
Hypothesis 3: New rating assignments from TRIS are expected to produce a significant (negative / 
positive) share market reaction  
 
1.3  Research Aims   
The primary objective is to examine the influence the TRIS has on Thailand’s securities 
market by considering market reaction to credit rating announcement, including downgrade, upgrade 
and new rating assignment on the firm’s stock prices. A secondary objective is to examine the 
information content of announcement made by TRIS by measuring certain attitudes and opinions of 
Thai investors in order to understand the role of TRIS credit agency in Thailand.     
   
1.4 Scope of the study 
 1. Study only listed companies of the Thailand Stock Market that have their credit ratings 
publicly announced focusing on credit downgrade, upgrade and initial rating assignment 
 2. Study daily stock prices for the five-year period from 2005 – 2009 collected from SET 
SMART’s database. There are 78 announcements with 60 firms during that time. 
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1.5 Contribution 
This research is a contribution to relatively scarce literature on impact of local credit rating 
in a small market such as Thailand. It provides a clearer picture of the role credit ratings actually 
play in practice by assessing relationship between credit rating announcements and market reactions. 
Additionally, the result of this study will convey new information to the market that would increase 
market’s awareness of credit rating and help set the direction for the development of higher level of 
credit rating quality.    
   
1.6 Research Process 
 1. Study on secondary data source by reviewing a selective of the existing literature on 
impact of credit rating. 
 2. Collect primary data by examining a sample of the initial rating assignment and actual 
rating change announcement by TRIS during the period 2005 – 2009 and retrieve historical data of 
bond issuers experiencing rating changes. The data of daily stock prices prior to and continue after 
the rating change will be considered 
 3. Apply statistical models to obtained data, make calculation, and summarize the data in 
form of chart, tables and percentages. 
 4. Interpreter of findings and analyze the effect of rating announcement on stock market. 
 5. Make a conclusion as to whether the obtained data supported hypothesis above  
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Chapter II 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
There are many literatures indicating roles and functions of credit ratings and investigated the 
relationship between credit rating change and market reaction. However, previous studies are mainly 
based on large stock market in the US, Europe and a few papers focuses specifically on Asia 
countries. Therefore, the assessment of the impact of rating actions in a small market, such as 
Thailand may be a useful check whether the roles and functions of credit ratings are consistent with 
findings of the earlier research which based on large developed markets. This section is organized as 
follows; Section 2.1 touches on role of credit rating agencies. Then, Section 2.2 examines impact of 
credit rating changes on stock returns. Finally, Section 2.3 identifies hypothesis which are to be 
tested in the paper. 
 
2.1     Role of credit rating agencies 
A credit rating agency is a firm that provides its opinion on the creditworthiness of an entity and 
the financial obligations (such as, bonds, preferred stock, and commercial paper) issued by an entity, 
according to US Securities and Exchange Commission. However, the influences of ratings on the 
securities markets have increased significantly along with the globalization of the financial markets. 
Recent years, there have been much discussion about performance of CRAs in assessing the risk due 
to the failures of CRAs to protect investors from financial disasters such as the Enron Corp. 
bankruptcy case, structured debt in subprime crisis. These failures are raising questions about the 
role of CRAs in financial market which becoming an internationally debated subject.      
Wakeman (1981) mentioned that investor demand for ratings since CRAs provide continuing 
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monitoring on credit risks acting in the role of “reputable auditor”. Also, Million and Thakor (1985) 
suggest that CRAs perform as “screening agents” certifying the values of the firm they rate. 
Moreover, Boot, Milbourne and Schmeits (2006) propose an interesting study about their function 
that rating agencies could be seen as “information equalizer” which allows an equalization of 
investor information and a coordination of their expectations. However, the role of the CRAs is still 
ambiguous and there is no conclusion finding up to now. Therefore, taking into consideration the 
viewpoint of CRAs of how they define themselves may lead to a better understanding. The big three 
players (Moody's, S&P and Fitch) in rating industry identify themselves as follows:   
To begin with Moody's, the company regards itself as  
‘An essential component of the global capital markets, providing credit ratings, research, tools and 
analysis that contribute to transparent and integrated financial markets.’ 
Next, with respect to information provided by S&P regarding the role of rating firm, 
‘Many investors know Standard & Poor’s for its respected role as an independent provider of credit 
ratings and as the home of the S&P 500 benchmark index’ 
Additionally, the firm mentioned about the role of rating that 
‘Ratings are an independent benchmark of creditworthiness, widely accepted by investors as a 
convenient and objective tool for differentiating credit quality, and enable more efficient capital 
market.’  
Lastly, Fitch describe the role of rating agency is  
‘To gather and analyze a variety of financial, industry, market and economic information, synthesize 
that information, and publish independent, credible assessments of the creditworthiness of 
securities and issuers, thereby providing investors with an important input into their decision 
making process.’ 
Also, Fitch clearly explains that ratings are a credit opinion and only one component of the 
information that the firm provides to market participants.  
By considering all these perspectives provided by CRAs, the role of credit agencies can be 
summarized into three key functions contributing to investors, issuers, and the market.  
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For investor and investment bankers : Investor protection 
CRAs are able to aid the investor in determining the level of risk and returns associated with bond. It 
is believed CRAs are information specialists who have access to nonpublic information of issuer. 
Particularly for investment bankers, S&P suggests that they may use credit ratings to benchmark the 
relative credit risk of different debt issues, as well as to set the initial pricing for individual debt 
issues they structure, and to help determine the interest rate these issues will pay. 
For issuers : Lower cost of borrowing and Pricing decision  
Normally, the interest payable on corporate bonds is linked to the rating assigned. As S&P says, the 
more creditworthy an issuer or an issue is, the lower the interest rate the issuer would typically have 
to pay to attract investors. Issuers are motivated to improve financial structures to obtain a high 
rating for their corporate debt in order to lower cost of borrowing. Especially for pricing decision, 
credit ratings may help issuers anticipate the interest rate to be offered on their new debt issues.  
For market : Efficient Capital Market 
Efficient Market Hypothesis - theory posits that prices on traded securities already reflect all known 
information, and instantly change to reflect new information. In providing credit rating information 
on default risk, investors have access to information in helping them assess credit risk and compare 
different issuers when making investment decisions. Rating agencies therefore would help create an 
efficient capital market. 
 
2.2 Impact of credit rating changes on stock returns 
Results in previous studies on the effect of rating agency announcement on security prices have 
been mixed. Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich(1992), Ederington and Goh (1998), present evidence of 
a negative market response to downgrades in bond ratings while no reaction is found for upgrades. 
On the other hand, some evidences from non-US research indicate such as Gropp and 
Richards(2001), Elayan(2003) Ezeldin and Mohd (2006), and Pilar and M. Robles (2007) find some 
negative effects on stock returns associated with downgrade but report significant stock market 
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return following upgrade announcement of ratings. See figure 1 on page 12 for summary reviews of 
literature related to impact of credit rating changes on stock returns. 
 
Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich(1992) examine a sample of 841 downgrades and 292 upgrades 
observations in the US in the period 1977-1982 for both bond and stock securities. The entire sample 
of downgrades provides strong evidence of bond and stock price effects. Moreover, in case of 
downgrades, they found the average excess bond returns are stronger for below investment grade 
bonds than for investment grade bonds. On the other hand, in case of upgrades, there is some 
evidence of a significant positive mean excess bond return but there is no evidence of a significant 
positive mean excess stock return. Their study also divide observations into "non-contaminated" and 
"contaminated" if there is any other news than credit rating announcement in the Wall Street Journal 
during period used. Specifically, they find significant excess return from downgrades and negative 
watches. They report the mean excess stock return for non-contaminated downgrade observations is 
-2.14% and a small negative reaction of additions to the credit watch list is -0.79% for their full 
sample. The result indicates that excluding announcements of non-contaminated subsample weakens 
the results for downgrade.  
 
Goh and Ederington (1998) study 483 Downgrades and 312 Upgrades in the US in the period 
1984-1986. Consistent with previous evidences from the US, the authors found market reaction to 
bond rating downgrade announcements but no reaction to upgrade announcements. They show 
results in two-day event window that the significant negative CAR equal to -4.849% for downgrade 
versus insignificant CAR equal to 0.095% for upgrade. Interestingly, the authors discover not all 
rating downgrades are bad news for shareholders because some rating changes are anticipated by 
market participant. They specifically note that a surprise downgrade is clearly bad news for 
bondholders but it is not necessarily bad news for stockholders. They found equity market react 
positively to bond rating downgrade announcements due to an increase in leverage but react 
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negatively to those downgrades associated with deterioration in the firm’s financial prospects.  
 
 
Dicheiv and Piotroski (2001) study 2,940 downgrades and 1,787 upgrades in the US in the 
period 1970-1997. Their findings are consistent to previous studies that significant negative 
abnormal returns following downgrades but no reliable abnormal returns following upgrades. 
Somewhat interestingly, they explore negative abnormal returns on the magnitude of 10% to 14% in 
the first year following downgrades. Also, the authors examine the impact of bond rating changes on 
long-run stock returns by focusing on firm size (market value of equity) and credit 
quality(investment or non-investment) and the sign of the most recent quarterly earnings change. 
Having compared the common stock returns of large firms with small firms, the poor returns of 
downgrade firm is visibly more pronounced for the small non-investment-grade firms. Moreover, 
they discover evidence of negative stock reactions at the announcements of the predictable future 
deteriorations in earnings.  
Previous research for U.S. firms generally suggests that downgrades negatively impacts short-term 
price reaction, while there is no significant market reaction to upgrades. However, an announcement of 
rating change may affect differently in small markets due to factors such as limited information and the 
level of disclosure. Those researches on small markets generate results either similar or different from 
previous literature in the US. The little evidence coming from non-US markets are follows: 
 
Gropp and Richards(2001) study 112 downgrades and 74 upgrades focusing on sample of European 
banks in the period 1989-2000. They tested pre-announcement and post- announcement reactions but 
finds little evidence of announcement effects on bond price. They also point out that no significant 
relationship was found between ratings changes and bond returns. Their findings of bond returns appear 
contrary to results found by the earlier the US literature. Turing to stock returns, they find strong effects 
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of ratings changes, but their findings suffer from contamination by other concurrent news events. 
However, the authors find effect of downgrade announcement weaker than upgrade announcement. 
More precisely, on the day of announcement, upgrades are associated with positive abnormal returns of 
1.2 % while upgrades are associated with negative abnormal returns of -0.5 %.    
 
Elayan, Hsu and Mayer(2003) study 34 downgrades and 27 upgrades in New Zealand in the 
period 1999-2000. They conducted a research of effects of rating announcement on stock price in 
New Zealand where considered small and developed market. Their researches reveal that the 
announcements of downgrade rating actions are associated with significant negative returns while 
upgrade rating action are accompanied by significant positive market reactions. Positive market 
reactions followed by upgrades in New Zealand are in contrast to U.S. studies where only negative 
announcements lead to significant market reactions. These results also support their assertion that 
credit ratings issued by the international credit rating agencies assume greater importance and are 
more valuable information to investors in the NZ markets.     
 
Ezeldin and Mohd (2006) study 135 downgrades and 71 upgrades in Malaysia in the period 
1993-2003. They investigate the impact of corporate bond ratings changes released by two domestic 
rating agencies firms, including the Rating Agency Malaysia (RAM) and the Malaysian Rating 
Corporation (MARC) on the common stock returns. Their results found that both downgrades and 
upgrades generate negative market reaction with some signs of information leakage. The finding that 
upgrades trigger negative market reaction is in contrast to the previous studies in the US, Europe, 
New Zealand. To investigate on this issue, they have excluded observations of the years 1997 and 
1998, as a result, there is no negative reaction following upgrades. Thus, the existence of negative 
market response following bond upgrades was mainly due to the impact of the South East Asian 
financial crisis of the 1997. All in all, they conclude that rating agency announcements seem to 
signal the arrival of new information to the Malaysian capital market.   
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Pilar and M. Robles (2007) study 33 downgrades and 34 upgrades in Spain in the period 
1999-2003. The authors examine whether the rating changes made by international agencies carry 
some new information to investors on the stock market or not. Their findings show the Spanish 
market has reacted negatively to the announcements of both upgrades and downgrades. They find 
slightly negative abnormal returns following downgrades and also find strong evidence of significant 
negative reactions in case of upgrades. Negative reaction following upgrades is contrast to the US 
studies but in line similar studies conducted in Malaysia. The reason behind is that investors 
understand the rating upgrade announcements as bad news since the detected response may reflect 
decisions that are being made by management that benefit bondholders at the expense of 
shareholders. Those decisions could include lowering the level of risk of new investment projects 
and the expected returns. However, such results support the hypothesis that international rating 
agencies serve to fill a gap in the information publicly available to investors. 
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Table 1 Summary review of literature related to impact of credit rating changes 
 
Sample size Market Reaction 
Study of 
Observed 
Countries 
Type of 
security
Rating Agent Period 
Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade 
Hand, Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1992) US  
Bond 
Stock 
Moody's 
/S&P 1977-1982 841 292 
Bond: Negative 
Stock: Negative 
Bond: Positive Stock: 
Insignificant 
Ederington and Goh (1993) US  Stock Moody's  1984-1986 483 312 Positive & Negative Insignificant 
Dichev and Piotroski 
(2001) US  Stock Moody's  1970-1997 2,940 1,787 Negative Insignificant 
Gropp and Richards (2001) Europe Bond Stock 
Moody's/S&P
/Fitch/IBCA 1989-2000 112 74 
Bond: Insignificant
Stock: Negative 
Bond: Insignificant 
Stock: Positive 
Elayan, Hsu and Mayer 
(2003) NewZealand Stock S&P 1999-2000 34 27 Negative Positive 
Ezeldin and Mohd (2006) Malaysia Stock RAM/MARC 1993-2003 135 71 Negative Negative 
Pilar and M. Robles (2007) Spain Stock Moody's/S&P/Fitch/IBCA 1999-2003 33 34 Negative Negative 
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2.3  Hypotheses development 
In order to investigate the role of TRIS in Thailand’s financial market, it is important to know what those 
effects of TRIS’s announcements are. There are two main hypotheses that can be used to explain the ratings 
change announcement effect: (1) Information content effect (2) Signaling effect (Hand, Holthausen, and 
Leftwich, 1992; Goh and Ederington, 1993). First, my assumption is that rating agencies base their judgment 
on inside information that is so confidential for the public to know. If credit ratings are based on only public 
information, no response in the market should be expected after credit announcement. Second, rating firms 
continuously examine the issuing company, so announcement of rating change may give a signal to the 
market about future financial condition of the firm. Therefore, the information content of ratings can be 
examined by focusing on the stock price impact of rating changes. If agencies act on the basis of information 
which is not already in the public domain, we would expect to find significant abnormal stock returns 
associated with rating changes. All in all, the primary question of this research is, does TRIS provide 
information to the financial market in Thailand? This thought leads to the hypotheses to be tested in this 
study as follows: 
  
Downgrade announcements from TRIS are expected to produce a significant (negative / 
positive) share market reaction    
Hypothesis 1 
H1 (null): There is no significant abnormal return response to rating announcements with 
downgrade rating actions 
Upgrade announcements from TRIS are expected to produce a significant (negative / 
positive) share market reaction 
Hypothesis 2 
 H2 (null): There is no significant abnormal return response to rating announcements with 
upgrade rating actions 
New rating assignments from TRIS are expected to produce a significant (negative / 
positive) share market reaction 
Hypothesis 3 
 
H3 (null): There is no significant abnormal return response to announcement of new  
rating assignment 
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Chapter III 
General characteristics of TRIS 
 
3.1 Rating system in the credit rating industry in Thailand 
In Thailand’s fixed income market, it is necessary to make the credit of bond rated by rating 
agencies in order to issue new bonds and sell through public market. However, credit ratings are 
required for all bond offerings with the exception applied to those offered to no more than 10 
investors, or in the amount not exceeding 100 million or to creditors for debt restructuring, according 
to rule and regulations of Securities and Exchange Committee of Thailand (SEC). At the present, 
there are two credit rating agencies approved by SEC which are TRIS Rating Co., Limited and Fitch 
Rating (Thailand). At the end of Aug.2007, Bonds registered in Thai Bond Market Association 
(ThaiBMA) have been rated by TRIS for 176 and rated by Fitch for 168. However, this study is 
intended to explore the effect of local CRA, rather than global CRAs, so only TRIS will be discussed 
in this paper. 
 
3.2 TRIS’s characteristic 
TRIS Rating Co., Limited (TRIS) was established in 1993 through the joint initiative of financial 
ministry and central bank. TRIS started its business by receiving technical assistance from S&P and 
consistently improved its method for the purpose of promoting the development of Thailand’s debt 
market. As of December 2008, TRIS rated approximately 260 Thai companies covering debt 
instruments worth Bt1000 billion. Those rated companies use credit ratings to mobilize funding, to 
enhance the company’s image, and to guide operational improvements.  
3.2.1 Rating criteria and methodology 
With regard to TRIS’s methodology, the corporate rating will be equal to the rating of company’s 
long-term bonds. According to the rating scale of TRIS, long-term bonds are rated with 8 grades 
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from the highest AAA to the lowest D. As for short-term bonds, TRIS rates with 4 grades from the 
highest T1 to the lowest T4. (See Table 2 below) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More precisely, the rating methodology is based on two broad categories, including business risk 
assessment and financial risk assessment as well as techniques for integrating these factors to come 
up with an overall rating. The component method can be summarized in the following. 
 Table 3 Rating methodology and criteria of TRIS 
Criteria Description 
Business Risk Assessment  Industry Analysis 
 Industry prospects 
 Degree of Competition 
 Laws and Regulatory Framework 
  Business Analysis 
 Business Strategy and Management Capability 
 ☆ Management Quality and Transparency 
Table 2 Rating scale of TRIS
Rating Scales for Long-term Corporate Bonds   
Scale Rating Definition   
AAA Highest rating,with smallest degree o 
AA Very low degree of credit risk 
A Low degree of credit risk 
BBB Moderate credit risk 
Investment grade bond 
BB High credit risk 
B Very high credit risk 
C Highest risk of default 
D Default 
Speculative grade bond 
   
Rating Scales for Short-term Corporate Bonds  
Scale Rating Definition   
T1 Issuer has strong market position, wide margin of financial protection, 
T2 Issuer has secure market position, sound financial fundamentals and satisfactory 
T3 Issuer has acceptable capacity for meeting its short-term obligations. 
T4 Issuer has weak capacity for meeting its short-term obligations 
D The rating for an issuer for which is in default 
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 ☆ Organization Structure 
 ☆ Track Record 
 Ownership/Group Supports 
 Business Diversification 
 Competitive Position 
 ☆ Raw Materials 
 ☆ Size 
 ☆ Market Share 
 ☆ Cost Structure and the Ability to Control Costs 
Financial Risk Assessment    
 Accounting quality 
 Financial Policy Analysis 
 Financial Ratio Analysis 
 ☆ Profitability 
 ☆ Capital structure 
 ☆ Liquidity and Cash Flow Protection Ratios 
  ☆ Efficiency ratio 
(Source: www.trisrating.com)   
 
3.2.2 Evaluation of TRIS’s performance 
 Annual default rates 
TRIS defines that annual default rates is the proportion of the number of defaulted issuers in 
each rating category divided by the total number of rated issues in that particular rating category. 
Table 4 shows TRIS’s record that many of Thai issuers defaulted during the Asian financial crisis of 
1997-2000 and after that none of rated issuers missed payment schedule until financial meltdown of 
2008. There were two companies carrying rating of A and BBB who suffered from liquidity problem 
in 2008. Those two firms were added into the total number of defaulted issuers in TRIS rating 
portfolio to 17 issuers.   
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 Cumulative default rates 
According to TRIS, three-year cumulative average default rates for each rating are calculated 
by estimating the probability of default during the three-year period after a company is rated. As 
indicated on Table 5, total proportion of defaulted issuers tends to increase because of number of 
years increase. However, the three-year cumulative default rate of TRIS remained at 10.07% even 
though the increasing number of defaulting issuers during financial crisis in 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4  Annual Default Rates of Rated Companies between 1997 and 2008 
(So
ce: www.trisrating.com) 
Table 5  Three-year Cumulative Average Default Rates of Rated Company between 1994 and 2008
(Source: www trisrating com)
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 Rating transition rates 
TRIS explains rating transition is the probability that a rating issuer may change over time. 
For instance, Table 6 shows that 72.73% of AAA companies were remained the same grade while 
1.75% of them were downgraded to AA by the end of the year. Overall, most issuers rated by TRIS 
had their ratings unchanged during the same one year period from 1994 to 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Comparison TRIS’s rating with others 
 Currently, there are two agencies (TRIS and Fitch) assign credit rating for local firms 
whereas Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s mainly rate government and some leading companies in 
Thailand. However, the Thailand CRAs position differs substantially from other countries positions. 
For example, in the U.S. rating agencies operate in a very competitive environment as competitive 
pressure forces them to maintain a high level of accuracy. If several ratings agencies rate the same 
bond issuing company, split rating can occur. In case a CRA give different ratings to the same issuer, 
potential evidence of mistaken ratings should be publicly known. On the contrary, TRIS and Fitch 
normally assign ratings to companies on specific request so there is only few evidence of split rating. 
Table 6  Average One-year Transition Rates Between 1994 and 2008 
(So
rce: www.trisrating.com) 
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In early year, TRIS rated the largest proportion of issuers within ‘A’ rating category of 
52.2% , including ‘A-’ accounted for 23.1% and ‘A+’ accounted for 17.3%. It has been argued that 
the credit ratings offered by TRIS are overly optimistic and do not have information content since 
these ratings are influenced by political and business ties rather than the underlying economic 
fundamentals of the issuers. Some might think credit ratings offered by global credit rating agencies 
seem to be more accurate and reliable than those of TRIS for many reasons such as a worldwide 
reputation, better rating standards and practices, to name but a few. While it might be true, in 
comparison, the ratings from the big three agencies are likely to be lower and more negatively than 
ratings from domestic agencies, including TRIS. It is mainly due to rating methodologies and 
selections vary from agency to agency. Global CRAs appear to apply a policy called the 'sovereign 
ceiling' ─ meaning that no private firm in a particular country can receive a rating higher than that of 
the sovereign. For example, as shown in the table 7 below, we see most credit ratings of Thai 
company issued by S&P do not stand above the country sovereign ceiling of ‘BBB+’. There are only 
two companies that S&P rated above country rating which are Advanced Info Service Public Co. Ltd 
(AIS) and Mega International Commercial Bank PLC (ICBC). The reason why ICBC got rating of A 
is because the company is Taiwanese bank subsidiary focusing on Taiwanese-related business clients 
operating in Thailand and obtained strong financial support from its parent bank. As a result, it has 
ability to breach the sovereign ceiling. As for AIS, there is no rational available to the public in 
explaining why AIS has escaped from country ceiling. Although AIS has achieved a credit rating of 
A-, it is only one-notch gap above the sovereign's rating in line with S&P's rating criteria. Despite 
the fact that ratings provided by international CRAs are likely to be more reliable than those of 
domestic CRAs, this study believes that credit ratings of TRIS have information content. TRIS as a 
local CRA can serve investors and issuers with insight into business environment in particular 
Thailand market. Therefore, examination of market reactions to changes in rating is needed to reveal 
whether ratings of TRIS are useful or not.  
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 Table 7  Comparison TRIS’s rating with others 
  
 
  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Remark: Data collected from publicly available sources in December 2009 
 
 
 
Sovereign Rating of Thailand TRIS FITCH S&P Moody 
Long Term Foreign Currency BBB BBB+  
Long Term Local Currency A- A-  
Commercial Paper  P-2 
   
Financial Instistutions TRIS FITCH S&P Moody 
Bank of Ayudhya PLC AA- AA-   
Kiatnakin Bank PLC A- BBB+   
Krung Thai Bank Public Co. Ltd. AA+ BBB  
Siam City Bank PLC A A-   
Thanachart Bank PLC A+ A   
Thanachart Capital PLC A A-   
TMB BANK PLC  A+ A+ BB+  
United Overseas Bank (Thai) Public Co. Ltd.  AA+ BBB+  
   
Corporates TRIS FITCH S&P Moody 
Advance Agro Public Co. Ltd. BBB B-  
Advanced Info Service Public Co. Ltd AA AA A-  
Asian Property Development PLc BBB BBB   
Holcim Capital (Thailand) Ltd. AA-  Baa2 
Mega International Commercial Bank PLC A+ A  
IRPC Public Company Limited A- BBB-  
Land and Houses PLC A- BBB+   
MBK PLC A- A-   
Property Perfect PLC BBB- BBB+   
PTT Aromatics and Refining PLC A- BBB- Baa2 
PTT Chemical PLC A+ BBB  
PTT Exploration and Production Public Co. Ltd.  AAA BBB+  
PTT Public Co.Ltd AAA BBB+  
Thai Beverage Public Co. Ltd. AA- BBB  
Thai Oil Public Company Limited AA- BBB  
True Corporation PLC  BBB  B-  
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Chapter IV 
Sample and Methodology 
 
In order to test the role played by TRIS, this study employs mixed methods, including 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. To elaborate, this research is based primarily on event study 
method with the intent of examining the effect of corporate rating changes on stock returns in 
Thailand as well as combines the qualitative survey in order to investigate the viewpoint of investor 
on credit rating agency in general and role of TRIS in particular. The event study analysis is first 
discussed in this chapter and opinion survey will be then described in chapter VI.   
 The first part of the study investigates the impact of rating change announcement and new 
rating assignment on the company’s share return. The analysis concentrates on the effect on stock 
rather than bond prices for two reasons: 1) Thai bond market is considered to be emerging stage, 
facing problem of bond prices with limited sample size 2) for most firms rated by TRIS only 
historical stock prices are available. All announcement information was obtained from official 
website of TRIS over the five-year period from January 2005 to December 2009. The breakdown of 
TRIS’s rating action by year is showed in table 8 below. 
  
 
 
     
       
 
 
 
 
Table 8  Distribution of Rating Announcement of TRIS by year 
(1st January 2005 to 31st December 2009) 
Year Rating Actions  Outook 
  
New Rating 
Assignment 
Upgrade Downgrade Affirmation Stable Pos Neg Dev
Total 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % No. No. No. No No. % 
2005 15 2.86 12 2.29 3 0.57 59 11.2 74 9 5 0 89 13.53 
2006 9 1.71 9 1.71 1 0.19 65 12.4 77 3 4 0 84 12.77 
2007 6 1.14 7 1.33 5 0.95 98 18.7 99 1 12 4 116 17.63 
2008 10 1.9 13 2.48 10 1.9 79 15 99 3 10 0 112 17.02 
2009 8 1.52 4 0.76 7 1.33 105 20 99 4 18 3 124 18.84 
Total 48 9.14 45 8.57 26 4.95 406 77.3  448 20 49 7 525 100 
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Table 8 indicates that the majority of rating action is prompted by affirmation accounted for 
77.3% of total announcements, followed by about 9.1% of assignment, 8.5% of upgrade and 4.9% of 
downgrade. Nevertheless, a number of studies present that no new information is revealed by 
affirmation announcement and no significant market response is found. Because of this, affirmation 
is expected to provide no new information and not included in observation. Also, outlook and watch 
notice are not investigated due to database limitation. There are 119 rating action containing 48, 45 
and 26 announcements of new assignment, upgrade and downgrade respectively.  
 
4.1 Sample Data  
The effect of rating announcement on stock price is analyzed by event study methodology. 
Under event study method, a 31-day event window is selected, comprised of 15 pre-event days, and 
15 post-event days. For each announcement the 120 trading day period prior to the event window is 
used as the estimation window. And data of stock price1 were collected from SET SMART’s 
database. Simply put, each announcement is required to satisfy the criteria described below:  
(i)  Those firms rated by TRIS and listed on Thailand Stock Exchange  
(ii)  The companies have a full price history during the estimated window and event 
window in the period (−120, +15 days) around the announcement date (day 0) 
(iii)  There is no rating action in the overall period of 151 days 
(iv)  The companies with confounding events (such as dividend payment, share issues, 
bond issues, mergers, fund raising) in the 30-day period surrounding the rating 
announcements are regarded as contaminated. 
 
Above criteria brought a final sample down to 78 credit rating announcement. There are 30 
                                                  
1 This analysis used the average of the daily security’s closing share price over the entire samples that were taken 
from SET SMART’s database. 
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new rating assignments, 34 upgrades and 14 downgrades during study period. Table 9 provides the 
total of 78 observations satisfying the selecting criteria. About half of rerated companies and newly 
assigned companies have received rating in ‘A’ category. None of them has obtained the highest 
‘AAA’ rating in this sample.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Model of Analysis  
In order to assess the effect of TRIS’s announcement, abnormal returns and cumulative 
abnormal returns are computed through event study method. The abnormal returns are defined as the 
difference between the actual return minus the predicted normal return over the event window. The 
standard model of event study methodologies are based on detailed discussion in Brown and Warner 
(1985) and Campbell et al. (1997). To measure abnormal returns, this paper carries out the following 
steps. 
Step 1 follows Campbell (1997) by assuming that there exists a stable linear relationship 
between the market return and security return. Therefore, market model is applied to predict the 
Table 9 The final sample of a rating change for individual event and new assignments 
  
New  
Old   
AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- Total  
New 
Assignment
AAA      -  -
AA+ 1     1  -
AA      -  -
AA-   1  1 2  1
A+    3  1 4  3
A     7 7  4
A-      6 4 1 11  6
BBB+      9 2 1 12  9
BBB      4 4 8  6
BBB-      1 2 3  1
BB+      -  -
BB-      -  -
Total 1 - 1 3 8 7 8 8 5 5 - - - 48  30
Source : http://www.trisrating.com/ 
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normal return based on the return of a market portfolio. The return on any security i is determined by 
 
 
Where Rit    = Return of stock i on day t 
α i    = Parameter to be estimated 
        βi     = Parameter to be estimated 
Rmt   = Return on market portfolio on day t 
 εit    = Random error at time t 
The parameters of the market model alphas (α )and betas (β) are generated from a OLS2 regression 
for each company based on share prices during the estimation window 120 daily returns data ( -120, 
-16 ) prior to the event window. 
Step 2  then compute Normal returns3 of each individual stock within the event window for 
a period of 31 trading days ( -15, +15) around each announcement date. The event date ( day 0) is 
defined as the announcement date of an initial rating on a sample firm. The calculation of normal 
return is to multiply the daily SET return by the β of each security against SET index and then add 
up with the α of each security. The basic estimation equation of expected return can be written as:   
 
 
Where E(Rit)   = Expected return of stock i on day t 
α i   = Results from regression of returns from stock i  
        βi   = Systematic risk of stock i obtained from regression 
Rmt   = Return of market index on day t 
Step 3  simply compute the abnormal return for each observation in the event window by 
                                                  
2 OLS stands for ordinary least squares, a method for estimating the unknown parameters in a linear regression model 
3 Normal returns are the average return during some estimation period that doesn't include the event window. 
   (3) 
    (1) 
   (2) 
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subtracting the predicted normal return from the Actual return4 for each day in the event window.  
 
 
Where   AR   = Abnormal returns 
 Rit     = Actual returns  
E(R it)  = Normal return  
Step 4  after computing abnormal return(AR ) for each stock, measure abnormal performance 
based on cross-sectional data. The ARs are averaged across the number of firms in the sample on 
each event day to form the Average abnormal returns (AAR ) 
 
   
 
The sum of AARs over the event window is the Cumulative abnormal return which are computed as  
 
 
Step 5  finally test the significance of the AARs of event windows according to Hand, 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) by applying two general approaches: 
(1) The proportion of positive abnormal return5 
(2) A conventional T-statistic on mean abnormal return  
In regard to t-statistic (t-stat), the null hypothesis to be tested is that average abnormal returns on 
a specific day have mean zero, and cumulative abnormal returns over an interval have mean zero. So, 
the t-stat for examining hypothesis performs a single sample t-test approach. Symbolically, these 
                                                  
4 Actual returns are the percentage change in stock price at time which reflects the return to investors. It is due to 
investors are more interested in the returns given by a stock than its actual price. 
5 The proportion of positive abnormal return is the ratio of stocks of the firm with positive excess returns to firms 
with negative excess returns for each event day.  
          (5) 
     (4) 
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hypotheses would be expressed as 
Null hypothesis (H0)   :   μ= 0  ( The mean of abnormal return is zero) 
Alternative hypothesis (Ha)   :    μ≠ 0       ( The mean of abnormal return is not zero) 
The test is considered to be “two-tailed” because its alternative hypothesis does not specify whether 
excess stock return following rating announcements could be less or greater than zero.  
The conventional T-stat can be computed as follow: 
 
 
 
Where   = the observed Average Abnormal returns (AAR)  
 µ0 = “zero” in null hypothesis 
 S   = Standard Deviation of Average Abnormal returns  
n    = Number of announcement in event window   
Formally, to determine significance, one can either compare the absolute value of the t-stat to the critical 
value, or equivalently, compare the p-value to significance level. This research does the latter here in 
order to make it simpler to interpret. The p-value is the probability of the t-statistic, assuming that null 
hypothesis is true, with a value ranging from zero to one. This study compares the p-value equal to 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.1, corresponding to a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. That is, if the 
p-value is less than the given significance level, one rejects the null hypothesis. Put the same thought 
another way, this suggests that there is “statistically significant” evidence to prove that average 
abnormal return is different from zero. The process of calculating p-value can be done through a 
statistical software package named SPSS6. The following steps are conducted in SPSS to produce both 
t-statistic and p-value. 
                                                  
6 SPSS stands for Self-Propelled Semi-Submersible, a computer program which provides over 50 statistical processes, 
          (6) 
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Step in SPSS :  1.  Import data into SPSS 
2. Go to Analyze > Compare Means > One-Sample T-Test 
3. Select AAR and move AAR into the text box for Test Variable(s) 
4. Enter the Test Value (value under Ho = zero) and Click on OK 
Below is an example of an output from SPSS. In SPSS, p-value is associated with t-stat under 
Sig.(2-tailed). In this case, Sig.(2-tailed) or p-value of 0.041 is less than 0.05 so, the null hypothesis is 
rejected at the 0.05 level of significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter V 
Results from event study 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
including regression analysis, correlation and analysis of variance. Originally named Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences, it was written in 1968 by Stanford doctoral candidate Norman Nie who formed SPSS, Inc in 1976. Recently in 
2009, SPSS Inc. was acquired by IBM. 
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The results have been analyzed in the following methods to empirically test excess stock returns 
following TRIS announcement in Thailand market.   
5.1 Analysis of Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) 
5.2 Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
5.3 Analysis of Individual Announcements through Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns (MCAR) 
 
5.1    Analysis of Average Abnormal Returns 
Based on cross-sectional method, the actual level of abnormal return performance can be most 
effectively measured at day 0, according to Brown and Warner (1985). This study therefore presumes 
the null hypotheses that abnormal returns at day 0 have mean zero. When p-value for t-test is less than 
0.05, this study has an evidence to reject the null hypotheses. Detailed result for mean and median at day 
0 of Downgrade, Upgrade, and New Rating Assignment are reported in Table 10.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10  Mean and Median Average Abnormal Stock Returns (AAR) for Sample of Firms 
experienced rating announcement by TRIS during 2005 – 2009 at day 0  
Sample Number of announcement
Mean of 
AAR
T-stat 
P Value
Median of 
AAR
Percent 
Positive 
  Downgrade 
All 14 0.77 0.25 0.30 64%  
Non-contaminated 11 0.64 0.41 0.26 50% 
Contaminated 3 1.28 0.49 0.33 67% 
   
  Upgrade  
All 34 -0.14  0.56 -0.17  44%  
Non-contaminated 24 -0.11 0.74 -0.57 42% 
Contaminated 10 -0.47 0.29 -0.05 45% 
   
  New Rating Assignment  
All 30 0.04  0.89 -0.04  47%  
Non-contaminated 25 0.01 0.97 -0.35 42% 
Contaminated 5 0.18 0.75 0.68 80% 
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From the result above, cross-sectional data of entire sample mean measure at day 0 provide no 
statistical evidence of average abnormal stock returns. Moreover, it is difficult to interpret due to several 
inconsistencies. For instance, negative average abnormal returns for downgrade are expected but 
positive average abnormal returns are found. Moreover, this study observes positive excess stock returns 
following upgrade but its overall mean turn out to be negative. For the indicated downgrades, comprised 
of 14 announcements, the mean and median AAR for downgraded firms are 0.77 and 0.33. Surprisingly, 
splitting sample into non-contaminated and contaminated subsamples reveals positive AAR for 
contaminated sample (1.28) is double the value of non-contaminated one (0.64). With sample of 34 
upgraded observations, AARs are negative with mean of -0.14 and positive percent of 44%. Again, 
when separately analyzing, this study finds negative AAR for contaminated sample, but not for 
non-contaminated. Additionally, of 30 new rating assigned observations experience mean and median 
AAR of 0.04 and -0.04. Even though those results from new rating announcement are generally positive, 
contaminated subsamples generate bigger positive excess returns than that of non-contaminated. This 
reveals the fact that contaminated data has influence on abnormal performance which could possibly 
overestimate the stock price effects of rating change. This is consistent with the study of Hand, 
Holthausen and Leftwich(1992), presenting that size of abnormal return for contaminated group is larger 
than non-contaminated one. Simply put, the analysis above show that abnormal performance at day 0 are 
not reliably different from zero with stronger price respond in contaminated sample. Thus, the following 
analysis will turn to consider the interval of (-15, +15) by illustrating only non-contaminated sample. 
The results for the whole sample and contaminated sample are contained as an appendix.  
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Table 11 explains value of AARs and t-stat (p value) in regard to downgrade, upgrade, and new 
rating announcement based on non-contaminated subsample during 31 day surrounding rating 
announcement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table11  Result for AAR and T-stat ( p value) for TRIS announcements based on non-contaminated 
subsample for (-15, +15) surrounding rating announcement. 
  Downgrade  Upgrade  New rating 
Day AAR P-Val Percent Positive  AAR P-Val
Percent 
Positive  AAR P-Val 
Percent 
Positive 
-15 -1.75  0.16  36%  -0.23 0.66 29% 0.51 0.40  46% 
-14 0.82  0.34  55%  -0.37 0.30 58% 1.01 0.06*  67% 
-13 -0.22  0.80  64%  -0.63 0.13 38% -1.19 0.03**  33% 
-12 -1.25  0.26  18%  -0.55 0.26 50% -0.44 0.24  38% 
-11 -0.86  0.43  36%  0.47 0.19 67% -0.05 0.90  46% 
-10 0.90  0.40  55%  -0.08 0.84 46% -0.16 0.66  42% 
-9 -2.35  0.00***  0%  -0.17 0.76 33% -0.22 0.68  40% 
-8 0.05  0.93  55%  -0.55 0.11 38% -0.17 0.62  58% 
-7 0.42  0.77  55%  0.45 0.42 50% -0.47 0.38  50% 
-6 2.05  0.01**  82%  0.26 0.52 54% 0.22 0.62  54% 
-5 -0.71  0.50  55%  -0.53 0.15 29% 0.28 0.41  58% 
-4 0.39  0.80  64%  0.77 0.15 67% -0.68 0.15  29% 
-3 -1.00  0.40  18%  -0.27 0.52 46% -0.19 0.60  50% 
-2 0.18  0.92  55%  0.28 0.34 50% 0.41 0.25  54% 
-1 0.62  0.40  36%  -0.10 0.74 50% 0.24 0.64  42% 
0 0.64  0.41  64%  -0.11 0.74 42%  0.01 0.97  42% 
1 1.72  0.18  73%  0.13 0.75 50% -0.84 0.11  38% 
2 0.81  0.22  64%  -0.08 0.91 46% 0.52 0.13  63% 
3 1.82  0.06*  64%  -0.52 0.26 46% 0.05 0.88  42% 
4 0.10  0.87  64%  -0.08 0.85 46% 0.23 0.58  54% 
5 -0.98  0.19  36%  -0.11 0.85 50% 0.05 0.81  58% 
6 1.55  0.04**  91%  0.49 0.63 46% -0.23 0.63  46% 
7 0.77  0.42  45%  -1.72 0.03** 33% 0.16 0.69  54% 
8 0.62  0.43  45%  0.18 0.70 54% 0.05 0.92  54% 
9 0.92  0.32  64%  0.95 0.27 54% -0.17 0.80  46% 
10 -0.67  0.33  36%  -0.21 0.64 50% -0.14 0.84  54% 
11 1.24  0.40  55%  0.39 0.51 50% 0.44 0.28  50% 
12 2.24  0.04**  82%  -0.34 0.48 58% -0.05 0.97  50% 
13 -0.64  0.46  36%  -0.94 0.01** 33% -0.73 0.02**  21% 
14 -0.81  0.58  55%  0.16 0.72 58% 0.61 0.20  67% 
15 -0.14  0.93  36%  0.19 0.73 58%  0.22 0.65  42% 
N 11    24   25   
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels using a 2-tailed test. 
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To begin with downgrade, the AAR is significant at 1 percent level on day -9 only in 
pre-downgrade announcement. At the same time, it is significant at 5% level on day -6, +6, +12 as well 
as significant at 10% level on day +3. Aside from negative result at day -9, majority of statistical 
significant AARs are positive yielding a value rank from 1.55 to 2.24. It might be possible to assume 
that there is evidence of positive abnormal performance associated with downgrades. In regard to 
upgrade, negative significant abnormal returns are found in post announcement period at day +7 and 
+13 with mean of -1.72 and -0.94 and statistically significant from zero at 5% level. This result provides 
little statistical evidence that stock prices react slowly and small steps in response to upgrades. Further, 
in case of new rating assignment, negative excess returns are found at day -13 and +13 which are both 
significant at 5% level. Meanwhile, there is a positive excess return which is significant at the 5% level 
on day -14. Slightly similar to upgrade, new rating assignment is likely to generate negative abnormal 
returns. Up to this point, it is observed from earlier results that downgrade seems to generate positive 
effect while returns to both upgrade and new credit announcement seem to reveal negative effect. In 
order to obtain a clearer picture, the results indicated above are shown as a graph in figure 1. The graphs 
for the whole sample and contaminated sample are contained as an appendix. 
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A quick glance at above graph reveals most fluctuation occur in downgrade curve. It is clearly 
noticeable that there is increase in AARs right after downgrade announcement while slight variations 
come from upgrade and new rating assignment announcement. This result seems to indicate that market 
more sensitive to downgrade than the other two announcements. However, it is far too soon to conclude 
without considering an estimate of cumulative abnormal returns.  
 
5.2    Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Table 12 reports results of the abnormal returns (ARs) and estimates of cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) for downgrades, upgrades and new assignments based on non-contaminated subsample.  
On the day of announcement (day 0), the values of CAR stand at -2.08, -1.36 and -0.88 for downgrade, 
upgrade and new rating assignment, respectively. Apparently, the value of downgrade CAR during the 
pre announcement period are negative before turn to be positive at day +2, changing from -0.36 to 0.45. 
As for upgrade, a quick glance reveals negative value of CAR for the entire period ranged from -3.26 to 
-0.23. The lowest value of CAR upgrade during post announcement period was recorded on day +7. 
Also, the similar trend is found in CAR value of new rating announcement. During the pre 
Figure 1  Average Abnormal Return (AAR) of rating announcement made by TRIS for ( -15, +15 ) based on 
non-contaminated sample 
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announcement period is recorded slight negative CAR with range of -1.72 to 1.52. Interestingly, the 
lowest value of CAR was appeared on day +1 at -1.72. In the case of new rating assignment, it is 
understandable that negative value of CAR become stronger after announcement. In order to obtain a 
clearer picture, CARs of stock return for TRIS announcement are given as a graph in figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure2  Estimates of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from TRIS announcements based on 
non-contaminated sample 
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Briefly explain from figure 2, during post announcement period, strong and positive abnormal 
returns came from downgrades while weak negative abnormal returns result from upgrades and new 
assignments. The curve of upgrades and new assignments do not illustrate an obvious decline in return 
throughout the 31 days surrounding announcement. The findings seem to present that market foresee no 
different for financial condition of company after upgrades and new assignments.  
This research additionally considers the Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns (MCAR) in 
different window period as illustrated in table 13 
 
 
 
 
Table 13   The Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns in different window period  
  Downgrade  Upgrade  New Rating Assignment
Window Period Whole Sample 
Non-Cont
aminated 
Sample 
Contamina
ted Sample  
Whole 
Sample 
Non-Conta
minated 
Sample 
Contamina
ted Sample  
Whole 
Sample 
Non-Conta
minated 
Sample 
Contamina
ted Sample
(-15,+15)  0.33* 0.21  0.90***  -0.09 -0.09 -0.09  -0.05  -0.02  -0.23* 
(-15,-1)  -0.10 -0.18  0.38  -0.04 -0.08 0.08   -0.06  -0.06  -0.03 
(-7,+7)  0.69** 0.56**  1.14***  -0.09 -0.08 -0.12  -0.08  -0.02  -0.37* 
(-5,-1)  -0.15 -0.10  0.45  -0.02 0.03  -0.15  -0.05  0.01  -0.32 
(-3,+3)  0.72 0.68  1.20**  -0.15 -0.10 -0.27  -0.03  0.03  -0.23 
(-1,+1)  0.92* 0.99  1.35**  -0.23 -0.02 -0.73  -0.23  -0.20  -0.42 
(0,+1)  1.07 1.18  1.56  -0.07 0.01  -0.27*  -0.36  -0.41  -0.29 
(+1,+5)  1.12 0.70  1.63**  -0.19 -0.13 -0.34  -0.07  0.00  -0.42 
(+1,+15)  0.73** 0.57*  1.41***  -0.15 -0.10 -0.25  -0.05  0.01  -0.45** 
No  14  11  3   34 24  10   30  25  5  
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels using a 2-tailed test.
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As far as concerns the breakdown of contaminated and non-contaminated data, the impact of 
contaminated sample can be clearly seen in Table 13. Specifically, in case of downgrade action, the 
MCAR based on contaminated sample are mostly different from zero and much stronger than those 
of non-contaminated. For instance, contaminated downgrades the MCAR (-7, +7) and the MCAR 
(+1, +15) are not only a lot bigger but also statistically significant at higher level than those of the 
uncontaminated events. That to say, the contaminated MCAR (-7, +7) is equal to 1.14% significant 
at 1% level, versus non-contaminated MCAR is equal to 0.56% significant at 5% level. The 
contaminated MCAR (+1, +15) is equal to 1.41% significant at 1% level, versus non-contaminated 
MCAR is equal to 0.57% significant at 5% level. Furthermore, MCAR generated by both upgrade 
and new rating assignment are reliably different from zero only for contaminated sample. This is 
more encouraging to confirm the contaminated sample cause a stronger stock price impact. Such 
evidence leads to believe that those excess stock returns are affected by other announcements 
released during the event window rather than by credit rating announcement from TRIS. Up to this 
point, the evidence from MCAR of full sample has not yet provided conclusive results. In order to 
have insight on the impact of the three announcements from TRIS, analysis on individual stocks will 
be helpful in determining whether the above finding should be acceptable or not. 
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5.3 Analysis of individual announcements 
All results discussed so far show the test statistics producing relatively weak evidence because of 
very small cross-sections of event are used. In particular, sizes of sample for non-contaminated group 
are less than 30, including 11 downgrades, 25 upgrades, and 24 new rating assignments. To resolve this 
problem, it is a fair assessment to take into account each stock of companies in the observations. It also 
leads to better answer to the testable hypothesis (1), (2) and (3). The detailed explanations of each 
announcement type are given as follows. 
 
 
Downgrades  
The earlier computed AARs and CARs invite to believe that downgrade announcements provide a 
positive impact on stock returns. This might sound ridiculous but the MCARs of interval (0, +1), (-3, 
+3), (-7, +7) and (-15, +15) in table 14 reveal some significant evidence, by separately considering the 
effects of each downgraded firms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14  Results for Individual announcements of Downgrade 
(0,+1) (-3,+3) (-7,+7) (-15,+15)
Industry 
Stock 
Code 
From To MCAR
(%) 
T-stat
P value
MCAR
(%) 
T-stat 
P value 
MCAR 
(%) 
T-stat 
P value 
MCAR
(%) 
T-stat
P value
Agribusiness  Asian 07 BBB+ BBB 0.18 0.28 0.03 0.91 0.09  0.69  -0.05 0.75 
Agribusiness  Asian 08 BBB BBB- 0.47 0.87 1.25 0.57 0.71  0.61  -0.22 0.82 
Construction Materials  KWH A- BBB -0.14 0.96 -0.74 0.25 0.05  0.95  -0.48 0.36 
Finance and Securities  NVL BBB BBB- -0.26 0.93 -0.72 0.34 -0.05  0.96  -0.39 0.64 
Industrial Materials SSI BBB BBB- 1.71 0.15 3.42 0.01** 2.81  0.01**  1.58 0.04** 
Property Development  CK A- BBB+ 0.00 0.99 -0.15 0.79 0.11  0.83  0.27 0.39 
Property Development  ITD A- BBB+ 2.46 0.48 0.83 0.28 0.05  0.90  0.06 0.89 
Property Development  PF BBB BBB- 7.35 0.25 3.61 0.07* 1.45  0.15  0.60 0.28 
Property Development  STEC BBB+ BBB- -1.11 0.58 -1.33 0.59 0.01  0.99  0.48 0.48 
Transportation & Logistics  THAI 08 AA- A+ -2.52 0.03** -0.01 1.00 0.25  0.81  0.02 0.97 
Transportation & Logistics  THAI 09 A+ A 4.84 0.05** 1.35 0.23 0.64  0.34  0.42 0.43 
Percent Positive of MCAR   55% 55% 191%   64%
Percent Statistical Significance    18%  18%  9%  9%  
***,**, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels using a 2-tailed test. 
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The average CAR during two-day window of (0, +1) are found significant in stock return of 
THAI7 for downgrade action in 2008 and 2009. Although both downgrade generated statistically 
significant at 5%, the results are inconsistent. MCAR of year 2008 equals to -2.52 while that of year 
2009 equal to 4.84. The reasons behind could be possibly expl 
ained by investor perspective. The first downgrade is viewed as bad news by investors, resulting 
in sell off and drop in share price but the second downgrade is seen as an opportunity for investors 
looking at the long term, causing increase in the demand and share price of THAI. In spite of such 
inconsistent MCAR value, it is clear that Thai market reacted quickly according to downgrade of THAI. 
Besides, the positive significant MCARs are found in stock return of SSI8 over three interval of (-3, +3), 
(-7, +7) and (-15, +15) at the 5% level equal to 3.42, 2.81 and 1.58, respectively. Incidentally, the size of 
reaction become increasing smaller with corresponding larger interval. One of the possible reasons for 
the positive price reaction is investor expectation. They might think downgrade as a sign to purchase SSI 
shares at low prices to make a profit in the future. Around the date of downgrade announcement of SSI 
                                                  
7 Thai Airways International (THAI), a national air carrier of Thailand and one of member of the Star Alliance. 
8 Sahaviriya Steel Industries Plc (SSI), Thailand's biggest hot-rolled steelmaker and the group's SET-listed subsidiary. 
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(as of December 2008), at that time stock price of SSI is considered undervalued when comparing to its 
book value per share. It was mentioned in the official website of the company that “the shareholders’ 
equity as of 31 December 2008 of Bt.16.6 billion and book value per share of Bt.1.27, almost 4 times 
higher than our market price of Bt.0.39”. Downgrade seems to indicate the right time to buy before it 
become full valued. Overall, this significant evidence leads to reject the Hypothesis 1 for no significant 
excess return associated with rating downgrades. It is interesting to find that downgrades produce 
positive reaction in Thailand stock market because this results are opposite from majority of previous 
studies in the US and any other small markets where announcements of downgrades are associated with 
significant and negative returns. However, this evidence is consistent with study of Goh and Ederington 
(1993) who present not all bond downgrades will lead to negative excess stock returns owning to some 
rating changes are anticipated by market participants. 
 
Upgrades 
The result for significant rating impacts is much weaker for upgrades than for downgrades. Table 
15 represents results for individual announcements of upgrade action from TRIS.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15  Results for Individual announcements of Upgrade 
(0,+1) (-3,+3) (-7,+7) (-15,+15) 
Industry Stock Code From To MCAR% P-value MCAR% P-value MCAR% P-value MCAR% P-val
Banking  BAY 08 A A+ 1.08 0.40 1.02 0.03** 0.60  0.04**  0.17 0.48 
Banking  BAY 09 A+ AA- -0.05 0.98 0.17  0.81 0.17  0.70  0.12  0.75 
Banking  TMB 05 BBB+ A- -1.72 0.13 -0.50 0.29 -0.14  0.70  -0.18 0.49 
Banking  TMB 06 A- A -0.83 0.27 0.03  0.95 0.05  0.88  0.09  0.72 
Banking  TMB 08 A A+ 0.83  0.69 -0.34 0.62 0.03  0.94  0.31  0.18 
Commerce  HMPRO 07 BBB+ A- 0.97  0.50 0.90  0.07* 0.89  0.10*  0.18  0.73 
Commerce  HMPRO 08 A- A 0.42  0.70 -1.13 0.29 -0.13  0.94  -0.72 0.42 
Construction 
M i l
TPIPL BBB- BBB -2.54 0.21 -1.09 0.34 0.87  0.45  1.49  0.03*
*Energy & Utilities  BANPU A A+ -0.86 0.24 -0.47 0.36 -0.41  0.16  -0.46 0.06* 
Energy & Utilities  GLOW A- A -0.32 0.82 -1.08 0.54 -0.64  0.45  -0.46 0.46 
Energy & Utilities  PTTEP AA+ AAA 1.34  0.12 -0.01 0.99 -0.07  0.83  0.06  0.79 
Energy & Utilities  RATCH A+ AA- -0.30 0.80 -0.02 0.95 -0.02  0.94  0.22  0.26 
Finance and Securities  KGI BBB BBB+ -2.22 0.14 -0.04 0.97 -0.17  0.73  -0.45 0.25 
Food and Beverage  CPF A A+ -0.06 0.95 0.01  0.97 -0.03  0.92  -0.16 0.53 
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Abnormal returns associated with upgrade announcement are revealed positive reaction in short 
interval and mixed evidence in longer interval. As for event window of 3-day window (0, +1) and 7-day 
window (-3, +3), 5 out of 24 companies have positive significant MCAR ranging from 0.52 to 1.98 
percent. Whereas, the MCAR of the 15-day window (-7, +7) and 31-day window (-15, +15) produce 
inconsistent results. For example, the MCAR of (-7, +7) carry positive results of 0.60, 0.89 versus 
negative results of -0.86, -1.70. Somewhat interestingly, there is only one stock price respond quickly to 
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upgrade from TRIS which is share price of NOBLE9. The MCAR of NOBLE in window (0, +1) and (-3, 
+3) are 1.96 and 1.98 and both significant different from zero at 5% level. Aside from NOBLE, when 
considering two consecutive significant intervals, stock reactions in upgrade group show diminishing in 
size of MCAR similar to those in downgrade action. Even though percent positive MCAR are relatively 
low in most windows, there is little statistical evidence of negative market response to upgrades. 
Moreover, taken together with the earlier analysis, test results of full sample of upgraded firm are not 
accompanied by statistically significant abnormal returns. In conclusion, the results do not strongly 
reject the hypothesis (2) that there is no significant abnormal return following upgrade announcement. 
This is consistent with common finding in the US such as Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) who 
fail to find any significant price reaction to upgrades.  
 
New rating assignments 
CARs following initial rating announcement appear to show very little significant reaction, based 
on p-value for the period. As table 16 indicates, there is no excess return during 3-day window of (-1, 
+1) arise after new credit announcement. It is appropriate to assume a delay in the market reaction to 
initial credit rating released by TRIS. Equally important, the statistically significant results are found 
only in stock prices of three companies which include KCAR10, BGH11 and UV12. 
                                                  
9 Noble Development Public Company Limited (NOBLE) is a leader in the real estate industrial and well-recognized 
brand in the middle- to high-end segments of the residential. 
10 Krungthai Car Rent & Lease Public Company Ltd (KCAR) is a Thailand-based company engaged in the car rental 
business 
11 Bangkok Dusit Medical Services Public Company Limited (BGH) is an operator of the Bangkok Hospital and a 
network of healthcare subsidiaries in Thailand and aboard 
12 Univentures Public Company Limited(UV) is one of the leading property investment companies in Thailand. 
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Table 16  Results for Individual announcements of new credit assignment 
   (0,+1) (-3,+3) (-7,+7) (-15,+15) 
Industry Stock Code 
New 
assign 
rating 
MCAR% T-statP-val MCAR%
T-stat
P-val MCAR% 
T-stat 
P-val CAR%
T-stat
P-val
Agribusiness   ASIAN BBB+ 1.23 0.06 0.30 0.58 0.13  0.70 0.14 0.47 
Agribusiness  STA BBB+ -0.28 0.15 0.07  0.84 0.25  0.51 0.13 0.72 
Banking  SCIB A -1.28 0.68 -0.76 0.27 -0.76  0.17 -0.43 0.29 
Commerce  BJC A+ -1.14 0.25 -0.37 0.23 0.35  0.28 0.29 0.28 
Energy & Utilities  ESSO A+ -1.03 0.64 -0.77 0.28 -0.45  0.25 0.14 0.75 
Energy & Utilities  BCP BBB+ 0.14  0.96 0.81  0.35 -0.06  0.94 0.14 0.77 
Energy & Utilities  TTW AA- -0.40 0.79 -1.01 0.71 -0.81  0.50 -1.51 0.32 
Finance and Securities  ZMICO BBB -1.15 0.16 -0.23 0.65 0.07  0.91 0.15 0.74 
Finance and Securities  KCAR BBB+ -0.66 0.28 -0.70 0.02** -0.38  0.07* -0.17 0.40 
Finance and Securities  TK BBB+ -0.44 0.61 0.11  0.83 -0.04  0.89 0.25 0.36 
Food and Beverage  KSL A- -0.61 0.80 -0.27 0.67 -0.29  0.34 0.16 0.70 
Health Care Services  BH A -0.96 0.12 -0.59 0.27 0.24  0.64 0.31 0.55 
Health Care Services  BGH A 0.95  0.25 1.81  0.04** 0.61  0.26 0.32 0.37 
Industrial Materials & SSI BBB -0.18 0.95 1.35  0.20 0.94  0.13 0.42 0.25 
Info & Comm Tech THCOM BBB+ -1.50 0.17 -0.67 0.32 -0.59  0.15 -0.21 0.60 
Media & Publishing  MAJOR A- 0.33  0.86 -0.05 0.96 0.00  1.00 0.02 0.96 
Property Development  ITD A- -0.75 0.21 0.13  0.83 -0.54  0.26 -0.41 0.18 
Property Development  PF BBB -0.66 0.75 0.75  0.31 -0.29  0.66 -0.38 0.48 
Property Development  TICON A -0.78 0.63 0.86  0.26 0.05  0.91 -0.22 0.45 
Property Development  UV BBB -1.01 0.26 -0.66 0.01** -0.65  0.01** -0.68 0.01** 
Property Development  Hemraj BBB+ 0.87  0.81 0.61  0.43 0.46  0.50 0.35 0.31 
Property Development  AP BBB+ 0.07  0.63 -0.10 0.84 0.69  0.39 0.14 0.77 
Property Development  MBK A- -0.62 0.72 0.09  0.87 0.34  0.23 0.18 0.54 
Property Development  ROJNA  BBB+ 0.01  1.00 -0.02 0.97 0.36  0.47 0.35 0.26 
Transportation & BECL A- 0.46  0.53 -0.41 0.43 -0.07  0.80 0.09 0.66 
% Positive of MCAR    32%  44%  48%  68%  
% Statistical Sig.   0%  12%  8%  4%  
***,**, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels using a 2-tailed test. 
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Among those three firms, it is noticeable that MCARs appear negative for KCAR and UV who 
assigned to BBB+ and BBB but show positive for BGH who achieved a rating of A. For instance, in the 
window of (-3, +3), MCAR of KCAR and UV amount to -0.7% and -0.66% versus 1.81% recorded for 
BGH. This is tempting to simply interpret that initial credit rating in ‘A’ category is viewed as good 
news for rated firm. In contrast, initial B grade rating seems to convey bad news and represent a 
negative outlook on the performance of company. Moreover, percent positive of CAR for new rating 
vary more than in upgrade case so, it is unable to draw any conclusion. In brief, the impact of new rating 
assignment from TRIS is ambiguous. Also, only reaction from those stocks might not be regarded as 
having found substantial evidence to reject the hypothesis (3) that no statistically significant result for 
new credit rating issues. This finding is different from research based on the small market like New 
Zealand, conducted by Elayan (2003) who found new rating issues are followed by positive abnormal 
returns. 
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Chapter VI 
A comprehensive survey 
 
Survey research on role of TRIS 
A great deal of researches intent to examine the certification function of credit rating agencies 
(CRAs) by addressing the impact of credit rating announcement on securities’ return but there are few 
studies investigate how the CRAs are perceived by market participants especially, based on the small 
market such as Thailand. Therefore, the aim of survey research is to examine the role of TRIS credit 
agency in Thailand by measuring certain attitudes of Thai investors.       
 
6.1 Methodology 
The survey was implemented via web-based survey services and personal email, depending on the 
preference of the respondent. The survey ran from May 15, 2010 through May 31, 2010 for two weeks 
and generated responses from 55 people. The target population is the current and potential investors who 
interested investing in Thailand’s securities market. In order to collect the direct data from target group, 
the survey was put online and made available to potential respondents through online community forums 
 45 
 
focusing on Thailand financial market; Settrade.com13, Pantip-Sinthorn discussion forum14 and Thai 
value investor web board forum15. Those websites bring together people from all walks of life and 
particularly the individual investors to openly discuss a wide range of finance topics. Specifically, 
discussions about the current stock market on Pantip-Sinthorn are often cited in two English daily 
newspapers, namely the Bangkok Post and The Nation, as a view of public opinion. Accordingly, the 
survey results gathering from such forums tend to reflect the opinion of Thai investors as a 
representative of the market participants as a whole. Aside from public forums, the questionnaire also 
sent directly to individual investors and people working for financial institutions. Among a sample of 55 
received responses, around 70% of respondents have experience investing in stock, bond and other 
securities. Even though 30% of respondents have never invested in security market, those respondents 
indicated that they are interested in doing so in the future.  
 
6.2 Summary of data 
Respondents were asked 8 questions about their perspectives regarding role of TRIS rating agency 
in Thailand. The questions can be categorized into 2 main areas. (1) Investors’ perception on credit 
rating and rating agency in general (2) Investors’ view on performance of TRIS. A copy of survey is 
contained as an appendix.  
(1) Investors’ perception on credit rating and rating agency in general  
                                                  
13 Settrade.com Co., Ltd. was established by The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) and has operated since November 
13, 2000. Settrade.com is known as the web's most comprehensive investment information in Thailand, including Internet 
Trading, Stocks, IPO, Bonds and Mutual Funds. 
14 Pantip-Sinthorn discussion forum is a highly popular financial-related online community in Thailand.  
http://www.pantip.com/cafe/sinthorn/ 
15 Thai value investor web board forum is a very useful website for the new investors to learn for stock investment and 
especially for current investors to discuss about individual stocks. http://www.thaivi.com/  
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In the first area, the surveyed respondents were asked three questions regarding the importance of 
credit rating and functions of CRAs. Following are the major findings in this regard:  
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
In terms of definition, almost 30% of respondents think a credit rating can tell them riskiness of 
company and 28.6% and 27.5% of them think credit rating can indicate creditworthiness of company 
and company's financial health, respectively. Only 13.2% view credit rating as quality of company. 
Summing up, this suggests that responding investors seem to see the credit rating as indicator of firm’s 
financial status in terms of riskiness and credit worthiness. 
Surveyed participated were asked about the role of credit rating agencies. Following are the key 
findings. 
 
 
 
Question 1  What does corporate credit rating tell you? 
Question 2  In your opinion, what is the role of credit rating agencies? 
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From the survey results, around 25.8% of respondents regard rating firm as companies’ evaluator, 
followed by 22.5% of respondents view rating company as information-screening agencies and 
information provider. All together, those three functions are related to task of gathering and analyzing 
information. As this reasoning suggests, in respondents’ opinion, rating agencies are believed to 
specialize in the information gathering and evaluating of a company's financial health. At the same time, 
rating firms are not expected by respondents to play a significant role in the market such as information 
equalizer, gate keeper of fixed income market and lubricant for the market. This result is fairly 
consistent with study of Millon and Thakor (1985) who explain the formation of credit rating agency as 
information-gathering agencies, “which acquire and process information for the purpose of certifying 
asset quality” 
Then, the respondents were asked to prioritize the factors that they considered to be important in 
determining investment. The answers to this question were reported in Table below.  
 
 
 
 
 
Question 3  What are the factors to take into consideration when looking to invest in any securities?  
Factors : Rank Mean SD 
Company’s performance based on public info 1 2.25  1.38  
Company’s reputation 2 3.02  1.54  
Market trend 3 3.22  1.52  
Credit rating 4 3.71 1.48  
Prospectus 5 4.29  1.47  
Opinion from professional broker, guru, etc. 6 4.51  1.77  
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Most investors rated “company’s performance based on public information” as the most important 
factor before investing in securities, followed by company’s reputation and market trend in second and 
third place, respectively. Credit rating and opinion from brokers are ranked fourth and sixth in order of 
importance. These results suggest that investors prefer to make their own assessment than rely on advice 
or statement of opinion about the firm prior making a decision to purchase any securities. 
 
(2) Investors’ view on performance of TRIS 
The second area addresses the issue of how accurate and timely investors perceive credit rating to 
be in general. Before dealing with the stated issue, in the first place, survey participants were asked two 
key questions; (1) if they have experience investing in stocks, bonds, and other securities and (2) if they 
have ever seen or used TRIS rating or not. Then, in order to ensure the assessment is reliable and fair, 
the answers from the same question are separately analyzed based on viewpoint of two groups; 
respondents who ever used TRIS and respondents who never used TRIS. As a result, this study found 
substantial differences of opinion between two groups. The detailed results are as follows:  
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Among 55 respondents, there are 33 people report that they have ever seen or used rating 
information issued by TRIS accounted for 60.0%, while 22 people (40.0%) indicate that they have 
never. Moreover, 28 out of 38 (73.7%) respondents having trading security experiences noted that they 
have ever used TRIS rating while the remaining (26.3%) respondents have never used it. On the other 
hand, 12 of 17 (70.6%) respondents without experience investing in securities mentioned that they 
have never used TRIS rating before. Meanwhile, 5 of 17 (29.4%) of them have no trading experiences 
but they used to determine rating from TRIS. In sum, it is worth to notice that seven of ten responding 
real investors are likely to put credit ratings into their consideration when making investment decision. 
Survey participants also asked about accuracy and reliability of rating offered by TRIS. The result is 
present as follows. 
Question 4  Have you ever seen or used rating information issued by TRIS? 
Have experience investing in securities No experience investing in securities
  
no of respondent percent no of respondent percent 
Ever used TRIS rating   
( 33 responses, 60% ) 
28 73.7% 5 29.4% 
Never used TRIS rating 
  ( 22 responses, 40% ) 
10 26.3% 12 70.6% 
 Total of 55 responses 38  100.0% 17  100.0% 
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Overall, 6 of 10 (63.6%) respondents indicated that they are not sure if ratings are accurate and 
reliable. When separately analyzing, the responses were quite different for the two groups. In particular, 
the view of respondents who used TRIS rating, 45.5% of them have doubt about the accuracy because 
they may have probably learned from their experiences. On the other hand, majority (86%) of 
respondents with no experiences of TRIS said they do not sure about this point as well. However, a 
further look at number of respondents who have used TRIS rating reveal that 51.5% of them have 
confidence in accuracy and reliability of TRIS rating. Only about 3.6% of total respondents do not trust 
TRIS’s credit rating. This main point of interest is that half of responding of TRIS rating users do 
believe that the ratings is an accurate reflection of companies’ financial condition.  
When considering the reasons behind their responses for NO and Not sure, the survey reveal the 
following rationale.   
 
Question 5  Do you believe that TRIS’s ratings are accurate and reliable?  
Question 6  Please give a reason why for answer ‘ NO’ or ‘Not sure’ 
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Overall, the first and major reason given is that rating information is only an opinion offered by a 
rating agency accounted for 43% of total respondents. Moreover, both of them are aware of the potential 
conflict of interest problem between TRIS and the rated companies, accounted for 20% of total 
respondents. Interestingly, 27% of responding investors who have used TRIS’s rating provide the 
second reason that they are unable to compare TRIS’s ratings with different rating agencies, whereas 
only 4% of the people who have never used TRIS’s rating are concerned about it. What’s more, having 
combined the fourth and fifth reasons, this survey found that around 20% of responding investors are 
worried about TRIS’s performance in terms of rating process.  
Additionally, respondents were asked about the ability of TRIS to maintain its issued rating in a 
timely manner. 
 
Question 7  Do you believe that TRIS’s rating change announcements are made on a timely basis? 
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Overall, both respondents somewhat believe that TRIS ratings are maintained on a timely basis 
accounted for 42%. And 38% of total respondents answered do not know which mostly constituted of 
respondents who never used TRIS (59%). Further, by looking closely at the users of TRIS rating, nearly 
half (49%) of them somewhat believe in timeliness of TRIS rating whereas 24% said they do not know. 
Still, 18% of those responding said they believe that published ratings from TRIS are updated in a timely 
basis. Conversely, 9% of total surveyed people share the opinion the TRIS rating are usually delay in 
updating. Admittedly, this result reflects some investors are not concerned about importance of 
timeliness of rating. At the same time, it seems to reflect the perception of investors that TRIS ratings 
are not yet completely up to date.   
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Lastly, respondents were asked the question how much rating provided by TRIS is useful. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both of them agree that it is somewhat useful accounted for 58% of total. The second highest 
answer is better than nothing accounted for 22% which mostly given by respondents who never used 
TRIS rating amounted to 41%. More interesting, 24% of TRIS rating users think it is very useful for 
them whereas 9% of them do not agree. On the whole, the results reveal that a majority of both groups 
somewhat perceive rating from TRIS as useful tool.   
    
6.3 Survey Conclusion 
Most investors give more importance to their own analysis rather than credit rating or other’s 
opinion before making any investment decisions. This tends to support the view that TRIS does not play 
a critical role in shaping investor perception of rated companies in Thailand. It might be because of 
increasing sophistication of investors who can analyze financial information of the company themselves. 
Question 8  Do you think credit ratings from TRIS are useful? 
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In fact, TRIS seems to obtain its role as company evaluator since it is believed to specialize in the 
information gathering and assessing of a company's financial health. 
Turning to considering investors’ perspectives on TRIS performance, many investors are not 
certain about accuracy, reliability of rating offered by TRIS. The main underlying reasons are based on 
the viewpoint that rating information is only an opinion offered by a rating agency. However, this 
criticism does not seem to be absolutely right because rating firm have access to information which is 
not available for public. If the rating is merely opinion, market reaction after credit announcement 
should not be found. Based on evidence from abnormal returns, investors seem to behave differently 
with respect to announcement of credit rating change by TRIS. It is not hard to understand that change 
in credit rating can signal to the market that the financial condition of the company has changed. Despite 
the fact that survey reveal low confidence in the accuracy and reliability of TRIS ratings, the ratings 
carry some information to investor 
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Chapter VII 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
7.1 Summary and Conclusion 
The ultimate objective of this study is to examine the role of TRIS credit rating agency by 
considering market reaction to credit rating announcements. This research incorporates both 
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quantitative and qualitative analysis, namely event study and opinion survey, with an emphasis on 
the former.  
This research applies event study with intent of investigating whether the rating 
announcement made by TRIS on the Thai firms contain information content for investors on the 
security market or not. Through event study, this paper analyzes the effects on stock prices of rating 
actions for a sample of 78 rating announced by TRIS during the five-year period from 2005 to 
2009.The main results show that stock price reaction to credit rating announcement are somewhat 
moderate in downgrade action and statistically insignificant in upgrade and initial rating assignment. 
The results obtained from event study analysis are summarized in table 17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In regard to downgrades, some significantly positive effects are found, which are in contrast 
to the previous literatures. Majority of findings explain that downgrade rating actions would impact 
market negatively. However, this evidence is consistent with study of Goh and Ederington (1993) 
who present not all bond downgrades will lead to negative excess stock returns, owning to some 
rating changes are anticipated by market participants. The study discovers that stock prices of three 
out of eleven companies react positively to downgrade from TRIS. One possible reason for the 
positive price reaction is investor expectation, especially for long-term investors. The investors 
acknowledge conditions of company from publicly available information and predict downgrade 
announcement prior to the actual release. When downgrade is announced, they purchase the stock to 
Table 17  Summary of abnormal return for TRIS’s credit rating announcements 
Sample of 14 downgrade, 34 upgrade and 30 new rating assignment during 2005 – 2009 
  
 Downgrade Upgrade  New Rating Assignment
  Degree of Significance 
Positive / 
Negative  
Degree of 
Significance
Positive / 
Negative   
Degree of 
Significance 
Positive / 
Negative 
Entire sample Moderate Positive fairly insignificant Negative  Slight 
Mostly 
negative 
Non-contaminated Somewhat moderate Positive Slight Mixed  Slight Mixed 
Contaminated Strong Positive  fairly insignificant Mixed   
fairly 
insignificant Mixed 
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make a future profit. This implies that the rating downgrades probably only affect the long-term 
investors. As this reasoning suggest, it is possible to conclude TRIS add value to the information in 
public domain.  
On statistical grounds, the evidence presented that market participants foresee no difference 
between upgrades and initial rating assignment. The announcement effect of a rating upgrade is 
inconclusive. The negative impact occurred well around upgrade announcement for the full sample 
but generally not statistically significant. When analyzing individual stock, positive and statistically 
significant abnormal return is observed in short interval but mixed evidence in longer interval. 
Moreover, the evidence for new rating assignment is weak although there are a few statistically 
significant abnormal returns that initial B grade assignment associated with negative results whereas 
initial A grade assignment associated with positive results.  
In particular, this paper finds important evidence that abnormal performance of contaminated 
data is stronger than those of non-contaminated which could possibly overestimate the stock price 
effects of rating change. This is consistent with the study of Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich(1992), 
presenting that size of abnormal return for contaminated group is larger than non-contaminated one.  
In incorporating statistics with survey analysis, both results suggest that TRIS’s rating 
announcement can be used as an indicator of a company’s condition. The statistical evidence finds 
that the rating does not signal the arrival of new information but in effect it shows affirmation to the 
market. This is consistent with result from surveys. Specifically, most investors rely on their own 
analysis before investing in securities by assessing company’s performance based on public 
information. This leads to conclude that announcement from TRIS seem to provide an additional 
information content in the Thailand capital market.   
 
7.2 Recommendation 
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This thesis provides new evidence for the influence of TRIS has on Thailand’s securities market 
by addressing market reaction in 2005-2009. Extended follow-up period of analysis could be the subject 
of future research. It might provide useful information about rating to the market and help set the 
direction for developing higher level of credit quality. 
Still, there are rooms for further research in two aspects. First, the impact of credit rating changes 
on capital decision of the bond issuing firm. It is because downgrade may result in higher costs for 
borrowing. This means the company has to pay a higher interest rate to attract investors to buy its bond 
and to compensate them for increased risks associated with lower credit quality. In order to avoid the 
possible downgrade or increase the likelihood of upgrade, the companies tend to manage their capital 
structure more cost-effectively. Second, the current issue of public concern is conflict of interest. As 
indicated in survey result, some investors are aware of the potential conflict of interest problem between 
TRIS and the rated companies. Since rating firms earn their revenue from the company they rate, this 
payment model could affect the rating process and the accuracy of ratings.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1A  Average Abnormal Return (AAR) of rating announcement made by TRIS  
for window event ( -15, +15 ) for the whole sample 
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Figure 1B  Average Abnormal Return (AAR) of rating announcement made by TRIS  
for window event ( -15, +15 ) for the contaminated sample  
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Table 11A  Result for AAR with T-stat ( p value) and CAR from TRIS announcements for 
the whole sample 
  Downgrade Upgrade  New rating announcement 
Day AR P-Val CAR  AR P-Val CAR  AR P-Val CAR
-15 -1.83 0.07*  -1.83 -0.21 0.61 -0.21 0.35  0.48  0.35 
-14 0.72  0.30  -1.11 -0.14 0.61 -0.35 0.89  0.05*  1.24 
-13 0.12  0.87  -1.00 -0.53 0.11 -0.88 -1.05  0.03**  0.19 
-12 -1.05 0.23  -2.05 -0.57 0.11 -1.46 -0.33  0.31  -0.13 
-11 -0.77 0.37  -2.83 0.34 0.25 -1.12 -0.07  0.83  -0.20 
-10 0.56  0.51  -2.26 0.32 0.32 -0.81 -0.11  0.72  -0.31 
-9 -1.48 0.07*  -3.74 -0.07 0.87 -0.87 -0.18  0.67  -0.49 
-8 0.06  0.90  -3.68 -0.28 0.33 -1.15 0.04  0.92  -0.45 
-7 0.66  0.56  -3.02 0.51 0.28 -0.64 -0.26  0.61  -0.71 
-6 2.29  0.00*** -0.73 0.18 0.59 -0.46 0.08  0.80  -0.63 
-5 -0.32 0.71  -1.05 -0.36 0.21 -0.82 0.24  0.52  -0.39 
-4 0.32  0.79  -0.74 0.48 0.23 -0.34 -0.80  0.08*  -1.20 
-3 -1.19 0.21  -1.93 -0.07 0.82 -0.41 0.07  0.85  -1.13 
-2 -0.18 0.89  -2.11 0.38 0.14 -0.03 0.19  0.45  -0.94 
-1 0.61  0.31  -1.50 -0.56 0.11 -0.58 0.04  0.91  -0.90 
0 0.77  0.25  -0.73  -0.14 0.56 -0.73  0.04  0.89  -0.86 
1 1.36  0.18  0.64 0.00 1.00 -0.72 -0.76  0.11  -1.62 
2 1.74  0.15  2.37 -0.23 0.64 -0.95 0.37  0.13  -1.26 
3 1.96  0.04**  4.33 -0.40 0.24 -1.35 -0.14  0.70  -1.40 
4 1.22  0.31  5.55 -0.41 0.30 -1.76 0.26  0.47  -1.13 
5 -0.67 0.29  4.88 0.07 0.88 -1.69 -0.06  0.86  -1.19 
6 1.21  0.04**  6.10 0.32 0.65 -1.37 -0.45  0.37  -1.65 
7 0.51  0.51  6.60 -1.10 0.06* -2.47 0.04  0.90  -1.60 
8 1.12  0.32  7.72 -0.10 0.78 -2.58 0.19  0.61  -1.41 
9 0.52  0.54  8.24 0.62 0.32 -1.96 -0.30  0.52  -1.71 
10 0.68  0.62  8.92 -0.25 0.48 -2.20 -0.06  0.84  -1.77 
11 0.97  0.40  9.89 0.31 0.49 -1.90 0.44  0.18  -1.34 
12 1.84  0.11  11.73 -0.10 0.79 -1.99 -0.23  0.62  -1.57 
13 0.45  0.66  12.18 -0.59 0.06* -2.58 -0.73  0.01  -2.29 
14 -1.13 0.36  11.05 -0.38 0.42 -2.96 0.36  0.39***  -1.93 
15 -0.86 0.51  10.19  0.05 0.90 -2.91  0.26  0.57  -1.67 
N 14    N 34   N 30    
 ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels using a 2-tailed test. 
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Table 11B Result for AAR with T-stat ( p value) and CAR from TRIS announcements for the 
contaminated sample 
  Downgrade  Upgrade  New rating announcement 
Day AR P-Val CAR  AR P-Val CAR   AR P-Val CAR
-15 -2.15 0.20  -2.15   -0.14 0.76 -0.14  -0.39  0.09*  -0.3
-14 0.35 0.77  -1.80   0.46 0.28 0.32  0.31  0.73  -0.0
9-13 1.34 0.30  -0.46   -0.26 0.61 0.06  -0.36  0.64  -0.4
5-12 -0.33 0.75  -0.79   -0.64 0.18 -0.58  0.19  0.73  -0.2
5-11 -0.44 0.63  -1.24   0.02 0.97 -0.57  -0.19  0.85  -0.4
4-10 -0.66 0.43  -1.90   1.27 0.00*** 0.70  0.13  0.77  -0.3
1-9 1.73 0.38  -0.16   0.18 0.63 0.89  -0.05  0.92  -0.3
5-8 0.10 0.92  -0.06   0.39 0.40 1.28  1.34  0.40  0.99 
-7 1.56 0.11  1.50   0.64 0.48 1.92  0.53  0.81  1.51 
-6 3.17 0.25  4.67   -0.03 0.97 1.89  -0.41  0.55  1.10 
-5 1.08 0.60  5.74   0.05 0.90 1.95  -0.32  0.68  0.78 
-4 0.04 0.96  5.78   -0.20 0.68 1.75  -1.33  0.39  -0.5
4-3 -1.90 0.24  3.88   0.39 0.36 2.14  1.13  0.58  0.58 
-2 -1 49 0 13 2 39 0 65 0 26 2 79 -0 40 0 61 0 18
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Figure 2A Estimates of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from TRIS announcements based on whole 
sample 
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A copy of survey on the role of credit rating in Thailand 
 
1. Do you have experience investing in stocks, bonds, and other securities? 
a) Yes   
b) No, but interested in investing in the future 
c) No, and not interested   
 
2. What are the factors to take into consideration when looking to invest in any securities? Please 
prioritize in sequence of importance (1 to 6, with 1 being the highest priority) the following 
factors. 
(＿)Credit rating         
Figure 2B Estimates of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from TRIS announcements based on 
contaminated sample 
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(＿)Company’s reputation 
(＿)Prospectus 
(＿)Company’s performance based on public info 
(＿)Market trend 
(＿)Opinion from professional broker, guru, etc. 
 
3. What does corporate credit rating tell you?          
a) Company's financial health    
b) Creditworthiness of company                   
c) Quality of company        
d) Riskiness of company    
 
4. In your opinion, what is the role of credit rating agencies?       
a) Reputable auditor     
b) Information-screening agencies    
c) Information provider        
d) Information equalizer      
e) Gate keeper of fixed income market   
f) Lubricant for the market  
 
5. Have you ever seen or used rating information issued by TRIS?        
a) Yes        
b) No  
 
6. Do you believe that TRIS’s ratings are accurate and reliable?         
a) Yes        
b) No        
c) Not sure  
 
If NO or Not sure, Please give a reason why  
a)  It is only an opinion offered by a rating agency 
b) No confidence in ratings process 
c) Unable to compare TRIS’s ratings with different rating agencies 
d) No appropriate rules to monitor behavior or performance of TRIS  
e) The potential for a conflict of interest exists 
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7. Do you believe that TRIS’s rating change announcements are made on a timely basis?       
a) Most timely     
b)Somewhat         
c) Usually delay     
d) Don’t know  
 
8. Do you think credit ratings from TRIS are useful?         
a) Very useful    
b) Somewhat useful                            
c) Not very useful    
d) Better than nothing  
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